Page 76 - Navy Journal 219
P. 76

Navy Journal 2019


             Factors Relating to Human Capability
                   First, smaller navies are dependent  on  the operation, training  and
             maintenance manuals prepared mostly in English and originated by the foreign
             ship-builder or respective OEM. This makes comprehension difficult for the sailors
             who operate and maintain equipment. It becomes acute when those manuals are not
             really prepared in English but rather are converted to English from another
             language (for example Chinese to English or Italian to English etc). This barrier of
             ill-structured language delays the repair and maintenance of the critical equipments
             like ‘Fire Control System (FCS)’, sensors, machinery etc and, therefore, impacts
             the operational readiness and availability of the platform for deployment. Secondly,
             a culture of too much supervision of a given task indicates centralized decision
             making and execution in smaller navies. As a result, subordinate officers and
             sailors are not mentally and institutionally ready to contribute effectively in a
             de-centralized execution environment. Thirdly, reluctance in taking calculated risk
             by senior leadership is a core impediment to delegating greater responsibilities to
             junior  leaders  and  subordinates.  The  most  likely  reason  of  such  centralized
             approach in decision-making is the fear of accepting failure by the higher echelon.
             At times senior leaders tend to keep the decision pending due to incomplete
             information. Also, it makes the Commander’s intent unclear as to the execution
             level.
             Factors Relating to Operation Area

                  The size of a navy is mostly dictated by the area of maritime interest (AOI) or
             area of responsibility (AOR) of a state. Hence, traditionally a smaller navy is likely
             to be responsible for a relatively smaller sea area. But this smaller AOR offers a less
             geographical depth for the navy to defend its homeland. Consequently, less
             geographical depth allows less reaction time for the decision-makers to mobilize
             and surge their effort against any likely threat. Under this purview, the centralized
             decision-making process of a smaller navy proves more reactive to a threat than
             more proactive in order to minimize the disadvantage of having less geographical
             depth.

             Conclusion and Recommendations
                  The genesis of a competitive decision-making cycle in the combat actions of
             the twentieth century vividly demonstrated the importance of trusting subordinates
             and the delegation of authority. These allow a freedom of action to the subordinate




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