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Navy Journal 2019


                   Operational Art and the Levels of War. Clausewitz in his book ‘On
             War’ stated, “One should not go to war without first being clear in his mind what
             he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” It indicates
             the close nexus between the Operational art and levels of war. But how one level
             affects the operational outcome of the other? For example, through Pearl Harbor
             attack the Japanese had tactical victory but made an ultimate strategic blunder by
             awakening the sleeping U.S into the World War. Another example can be the
             genocide in Vietnamese  village  Mai Lai which was ordered by a junior
             Lieutenant. This tactical mishap turned into a strategic massacre and under the
             severe protest of the U.S people, the U.S forces had to withdraw from Vietnam.
             Later, the U.S confessed about their missing interlink between the levels of war
             and operations in Vietnam.

                         VIETNAM WAR - THE SAD U.S CONFESSION
              In Vietnam, we were the great power fighting a war of little importance. We
              stumbled into Vietnam in piecemeal with no coherent vision or how we would
              use military to accomplish the goals. In short, we lacked a strategy. We began
              with  an attainable  national  political  objective  of  securing  a free  and
              independent  South Vietnam. We failed,  however, to attain that objective.
              Consequently, the military objectives and actions lacked logical connection
              with the national political  level.  We paid a high price for failing  to think
              through the conflict. (Source: Lt Col John P. Hunerwadel, Planning to Win: A
              Study in Strategy and Operational Art).

             Campaign Planning Tools

                   ‘Centre of Gravity’ (CG). Clausewitz stated, “CG is the hub of all power
             from which enemy military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength,
             or will to fight.”  Each Force will always try to eliminate enemy’s CG while
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             safeguarding its own. CG can be tangible or intangible and can vary at different
             levels of war (Table 2).

             Table 2: Cg at Different Levels of War: Operation Desert Storm
              Ser        CG               IRAQ              U.S Led COALITION
              1.    Strategic CG   Leadership of Saddam   Capability of potential alliance
              2.    Operational CG   Baath Party         US Carrier Battle Group
              3.    Tactical CG    Iraqi Air Defence System  Mine Counter Measure

             10. Defence Services Command and Staff College (Mirpur, Dhaka), Joint Warfare Precis, Key Concepts of Operational Art
             and Design, Chapter 6, p 6-2, (2006).



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